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The Right of Eccentricity
Introduction
"Eccentricity" conjures up images of a dowager living in a house
filled with cats or perhaps an old man who skips rope in the town
square - examples of behavior that deviates from established patterns
or accepted usage. Eccentricity implies characters that are harmless
and able to care for themselves. This Note's working definition of
eccentricity is aberrant but harmless behavior.
No further definition of eccentricity appears in this Note. The
remaining discussion considers whether eccentricity, aberrant but
harmless behavior, is entitled to constitutional protection under its
own name. This Note is about the right of eccentricity and the
converse limit on the state's power to control such behavior.
Justice Stewart stated the issue: "One might as well ask if the
State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically
unattractive or socially eccentric."' Justice Stewart assumed that
the answer was no. In search of the reasons for that answer, this
Note explores the principles underlying the eighth amendment ban
on cruel and unusual punishments, the principles underlying the first
amendment freedoms of speech and assembly, and the principles underlying the equal protection clause and due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment: the first amendment ideal of free and frequent dissent and expression of unpopular notions in whatever peculiar personal idioms; the fourteenth amendment struggle to treat
all persons alike, even those most disliked; the eighth amendment
goal to treat all with dignity even as society most righteously and
indignantly condemns; and the often forgotten fourteenth amendment
stricture that to act at all, government must have a reason, sometimes
must even have a good one.
These principles, taken together, suggest that government may
not control eccentric behavior. These principles, however, are not
ordinarily taken together. They underlie independently operating
amendments. Nonetheless, when presented with facts involving
state control of aberrant but harmless behavior in O'Connor v.
Donaldson,2 the United States Supreme Court borrowed principles
1. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
2. Id. "[A] State cannot constitutionally conflne without more a nondangerous
individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help
of willing and responsible family members or friends." Id. at 576.
[519]
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underlying the first amendment as though incorporated in the due
process clause, even though no first amendment interest was implicated in the case. The first amendment principles were embraced
3
in the "right of liberty."
When the liberty interests of schoolchildren were implicated by
classroom spanking in Ingraham v. Wright,4 the Supreme Court borrowed principles underlying the eighth amendment as embraced in
the "liberty interests" of the fourteenth amendment, while simultaneously holding that the eighth amendment did not directly apply
to the classroom spanking.
Many instances when courts have applied principles borrowed
from constitutional provisions not directly applicable to the case display a factual similarity. Each instance involved the control of
aberrant but harmless behavior. Recognition of that consistency
suggests the following rule: when the purpose of a governmental
action or regulation is to circumscribe aberrant behavior, that behavior must endanger society to justify its control.
Before exploring what the borrowing in O'Connor and Ingraham
might mean, this Note examines the principles of the eighth amendment. Although the eighth amendment is not always applicable to
problems involving control of eccentricity, the concerns confronted
under the eighth amendment also frequently arise under the fourteenth amendment. These concerns expressed by the Court during
the arduous task of defining the power to punish are of equal concern
whenever government seeks to control individual liberty.
Traditional Eighth Amendment Protection
Like the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
cruel and unusual punishment clause offers both substantive and procedural protections. The clause prohibits excessive punishments,
limits the types of punishments that may be imposed, and limits what
can be made criminal and punishable.- The clause also guarantees
that no punishment may be arbitrarily or capriciously applied." Each
of these protections is discussed separately below.
Excessive Punishments
Early in this century a minor Philippine official was convicted
3. Id. at 573.
4. 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977).
5. Id. at 1410; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).

6. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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of falsifying official documents in the amount of 616 pesos.7 He was
sentenced to pay a fine of 4,000 pesetas and to serve fifteen years of
Cadena Temporal. The Cadena consisted of hard, painful labor
while the prisoner was chained at the ankles and wrists, loss of marital authority, and loss of parental and property rights for the term
of confinement. After release, the offender was perpetually barred
from public office and from voting and was subject to surveillance
and reporting for life. 8
While expressing deference to the power of the legislature to
define crimes and their punishment, the United States Supreme Court
held in Weems v. United States that because even the minimum sentence prescribed for the offense, twelve years of Cadena, was so out
of proportion to the crime, no sentence imposed under that law could
ever be constitutional. The test the Court used to determine excessiveness was not precisely articulated in the case but was an amorphous application of humane justice aided by comparison with punishments imposed for similar offenses in other civilized jurisdictions. 10
Prohibited Punishments
In 1944 twenty-year-old private Albert Trop escaped from the
Army stockade at Casablanca. 1 He voluntarily returned the following day, cold and hungry. Trop was convicted by general court
martial of wartime desertion and sentenced to three years hard labor,
forfeiture of pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. Eight
years later, Trop applied for a passport which was denied on the
grounds that he had lost his citizenship for wartime desertion. The
Supreme Court held in Trop v. Dulles that the federal government
may not punish a person by divesting his citizenship.' 2 Citizenship
may be lost only by a voluntary renunciation. In the exercise of its
power to act in the field of foreign affairs, Congress may recognize
certain language or conduct as a voluntary renunciation when the
language or conduct interferes with or impedes Congress' solution of
international problems.
Trop must be considered along with its companion case, Perez
7. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). In the text, pesos refers to
Phillipine currency; pesetas refers to Spanish currency.
8. Id. at 3.66.
9. Id. at 382.
10. The test of excessiveness has been given considerable attention by the United
States Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861 (1977), and by the California Supreme Court in In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217
(1972).
11. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
12. Id. at 91-93.
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v. Brownell.13 In Perez, the Court upheld the expatriation of a citizen for voting in a foreign election, basing its decision on Congress'
power to control active participation in foreign political elections to
prevent national embarassment. If necessary, the nation may disown
one of its own. The issue in Perez and Trop was whether the expatriations were necessary in the furtherance of national foreign policy. If not, the effect is punitive, and loss of citizenship is a punishment forbidden by the eighth amendment. Any punitive measure
imposing expatriation is unconstitutional; 14 however, when a measure
has a valid regulatory purpose, as in Perez, it is constitutional despite
the eighth amendment.
Trop is important for two reasons. First, certain punishments,
among them expatriation, are forbidden in all circumstances by the
eighth amendment. 15 Second, the eighth amendment applies to statutes enacted for punitive purposes even when denominated "civil"
or "regulatory": the label does not matter; the purpose is determinative. 16
Status Offenses
In 1962 in Robinson v. California1 7 the Supreme Court decided
that a narcotics addict may not be punished simply for being an addict. Lawrence Robinson was arrested by two Los Angeles police
officers who observed track marks on his arms. At trial the jury was
instructed that it was a misdemeanor to be addicted to the use of
narcotics. The Supreme Court held that any punishment imposed
upon a mere status was cruel and unusual,' 8 stating, "Even one day
in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime'
of having a common cold." 19
13. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
Perez was overruled in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253
(1967), holding that Congress has no implied power in foreign affairs that justifies
involuntary expatriation for voting in a foreign election.
14. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958).
15. Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1410 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 97 S.
Ct. 285, 290 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
16. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 n.30 (1968); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 97 S. Ct. 2777, 2807 (1977).
But see Ingraham v. Wright,
97 S. Ct. 1401, 1412 n.39 (1977); notes 82-86 & accompanying text infra.
17. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
18. "The entire thrust of Robinson!s interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the accused has
committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which society has an interest in
preventing, or perhaps in historical common law terms, has committed some actus reus."
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968).

19.

370 U.S. at 667.

See Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and
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The Robinson prohibition against status crimes does not apply
whenever the crime requires an act, however slight. In Powell v.
Texas, 20 a chronic alcoholic was convicted of public drunkenness.
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction against an argument that
it punished a status, finding that an alcoholic need not be in public
places and that his being there was a punishable act even though the
21
alcoholic might have no control over his drunkenness.
Being in a specified place is an act for the purposes of the eighth
amendment according to Powell. Being in a specified place is not
an act for the purpose of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment according to Lambert v. California.22 In Lambert, appellant was convicted of being in Los Angeles without registering
as a felon. The Court noted that violation of the ordinance was
"unaccompanied by any activity whatever, mere presence in the city

being the

test."23

Due process requires notice of the duty to register

under such circumstances. 24 Thus, both the eighth and fourteenth
amendments afford protection against punishment of status offenses
but differ in what each will recognize as a status.

the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HAnv. L. RE~V. 635 (1966); Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HAnv. L. REv. 1071 (1964).
20. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
21. Powell v. Texas is a plurality decision. The Court divided into three camps:
four justices, Marshall, Warren, Black, and Harlan in the plurality; four justices, Fortas,
Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart in dissent; and Justice White the swing vote in the
middle. An additional concurring opinion was filed by Justice Black of the plurality,
joined by Harlan. At least eight justices found that an act was subject to punishment
under the statute. The principal plurality opinion stated, "The state of Texas . * *
has not sought to punish a mere status, as California did in Robinson .... ..
392
U.S. 514, 532 (opinion by Marshall, J.). The dissenting opinion remarked, "The statute covers more than a mere status." 392 U.S. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting). In
addition, the separate concurrence by Justice Black noted, "If an intoxicated person
is actually carried into the street by someone else, 'he' does not do the act at all,
and of course he is entitled to acquittal." 392 U.S. at 540 n.1 (Black, J., concurring). Only Justice White's position was unclear. Justice White said, "If it were
necessary to distinguish between 'acts' and 'conditions' for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment . . . I would not trivialize that concept by drawing a nonexistent line between the man who appears in public drunk and that same man five minutes later who
is then 'being' drunk in public." 392 U.S. at 550 n.2 (White, J., concurring).
The Court split over whether Robinson recognized a constitutional defense when
the acts punished were done involuntarily or were done under the compulsion of a
disease. On that issue the plurality of four justices concluded there was no constitutional defense, the dissent of four justices concluded there was a constitutional defense, and the swing opinion by Justice White concluded there might be a constitutional defense but that compulsion sufficient to raise the defense was not established
by the record in the case.
22. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
23. Id. at 229.
24. Id.
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Arbitrarily Imposed Punishment
In the 1972 death penalty case, Furman v. Georgia,25 the Supreme
Court held that statutory schemes vesting the jury with the power
to impose the death penalty in its discretion, without providing criteria to guide the jury in deciding which cases merit death, violate
the eighth amendment. 26 Arbitrary infliction of the death penalty
is "cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning
27
is cruel and unusual."
The year before Furman, the Court had sustained the constitutionality of the death penalty in McGautha v. California, stating that
use of the death penalty was not prevented by any provision of the
Constitution. 2 That Furman overruled McGautha is not entirely
clear. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Furman noted that the
grant of certiorari in McGautha had been limited to claims under
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, 29 implying that on those issues McGautha would still be
followed. That conclusion was shared by Justice Rehnquist, who
thought McGautha was not abandoned until the decision in Woodson
v. North Carolina,30 which invalidated a mandatory death sentence
because it did not permit consideration of individual factors in fixing
the penalty.
The holding in McGautha, based on the fourteenth amendment
alone, is distinguishable from that in Furman, based on the eighth
and fourteenth amendments, but the result provokes thoughts of a
separate equal protection standard contained in the eighth amendment. The only consistent theme of the five opinions of the Furman
majority is the arbitrariness and discrimination of unguided use of
the death penalty. 31 The equal protection clause was meant to cure
the frailty of discrimination. Yet in McGautha, that frailty was not
sufficiently offensive to the fourteenth amendment to require invalidation. In Furman, that frailty was found offensive to the eighth
amendment. Justice Douglas, concurring in Furman, saw "increasing
recognition of the fact that the basic theme of equal protection is
25.
26.
Each of
totalling
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
(1975).

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
The Court's holding was presented in a one paragraph per curiam decision.
the nine Justices wrote a separate opinion, five concurring, four dissenting,
232 pages. Id.
Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971).
408 U.S. 238, 310 n.12 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
428 U.S. 280, 319-20 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See L. BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 45-49
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implicit in 'cruel and unusual' punishments."3 2 If the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not require invalidation of the statutes in McGautha but the eighth amendment does
require invalidation in the face of an assault similar to equal protection arguments, the question arises as to what the eighth amendment
requires that the fourteenth does not? The difference may simply
be the degree of scrutiny the Court is prepared to focus on the issue
under each amendment.
These eighth amendment issues parallel and frequently arise upon the same facts as fourteenth amendment issues: the arbitrariness
issue in Furman, the regulatory-punitive distinction in Trop, and the
status crime issue in Robinson. These issues arise again in O'Connor
v. Donaldson and Ingraham v. Wright, both purportedly due process
cases, where protection of liberty interests seemingly rests, in part,
upon the principles applied under the eighth amendment.
The Right to Treatment and
O'Connor v. Donaldson
Prior to 1975 a few lower court decisions relying on the eighth
amendment and Robinson v. California3 3 had ruled that the mentally
ill could not be held for long periods of time without treatment. The
prohibition against punishing status offenses established by Robinson,
however, does not strictly apply in cases of civil commitment because
no conviction or punishment for any crime is involved. By an implicit analysis along the lines used in Trop v. Dulles, finding a punitive purpose underlying the civil commitment when that commitment
was unaccompanied by any treatment, courts applied the eighth
amendment and held Robinson forbade the incarceration because it
34
was punishment for a status offense.
Through the application of Trop and Robinson, the eighth amendment simply forbids the incarceration, sub nomine commitment. Under the Trop analysis, if treatment is provided the effect of the incarceration is no longer punitive. In that case, the state does not
seek to punish the individual but to aid him. Therefore, there is no
punitive purpose, the eighth amendment does not apply at all, and
32. 408 U.S. 238, 249 (Douglas, J., concurring).
33. See Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Martarella v. Kelley,
349 F. Supp. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Walker, 335 F. Supp. 705,
708-09 (N.D. Cal. 1971); United States v. Jackson, 306 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
34. See Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for
Constitutional Analysis, 60 Mn¢N. L. REv. 379 n.153 (1976); Developments in the
Law - Civil Commitment of the Mentally 11U,87 H.iv. L. REv. 1190, 1259-64 (1974).
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the incarceration is permissible. 35 The logical result is a rule permitting commitment with treatment and forbidding commitment with36
out treatment.
Advocates of the right to treatment take one further step in this
analysis, urging that courts order treatment instead of ordering release from confinement. Under Trop and Robinson, it is commitment
which is forbidden. Lack of treatment is merely the factor under
Trop that causes the Robinson rule to apply. Because the real factual distinction between permissible and impermissible commitment
for mental illness is treatment, the state can remedy an impermissible
commitment by offering treatment. Therefore, advocates of the right
to treatment have asserted the court can also cure the constitutional
infirmity by ordering treatment.37 The power of courts to provide
remedies, however, is not coextensive with the remedial power of
state executive or legislative authorities. Even when the court has
the power to remedy an intolerable confinement by ordering treatment, there is yet a great chasm to cross before reaching the proposition that treatment rather than release is the constitutionally mandated remedy. The Bill of Rights is ordinarily understood as a document telling government what it may not do, not what it must do.
The analysis that forbids commitment without treatment under
the eighth amendment and Robinson bears a striking resemblance to
due process analysis. 38 The essential hurdle in the eighth amendment approach is whether the amendment applies at all. Applicability of the eighth amendment depends on whether a punitive purpose is ascribed to the commitment. Whether a punitive purpose
is found depends on whether the state acted to achieve a legitimate
purpose and whether the means chosen operated to achieve that purpose. 39 This analysis also is used under the due process clause to
determine the proper sweep of the state's police power.
Most cases that discuss the state's police power generally accord
it an all pervasive expanse limited only when palpably invading fundamental rights. The general contours of the police power were de35. Compare Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) with Perez v. Brownell, 356
U.S. 44 (1958).
36. See, Note, O'Connor v. Donaldson: The Supreme Court Sidesteps the Right
to Treatment, 13 CAL. WESTERN L. REV. 168 (1976).
37. See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
38.

See, Note, Donaldson, Dangerousness, and the Right to Treatment, 3

HASTINGS

L.Q. 599, 600-01 (1976); Bassiouni, The Right of the Mentally Ill to Cure and
Treatment: Medical Due Process, 15 DE PAuL L. REV. 291 (1966).
39. For an application and discussion of this type of analysis in another context,
see, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Clark, Civil and Criminal
CON.

Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV.
379 (1976).
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scribed in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, which listed three factors that
must appear before a state is justified in interposing its aithority:
(1) the interests of the public must require such interference, (2)
the means must be reasonably necessary to accomplish the 4purpose,
0
and (3) the requirements must not be unduly oppressive.
When the Supreme Court was asked to consider commitment
for mental illness in O'Connorv. Donaldson,41 it approached the problem in terms of due process rather than in terms of cruel and unusual
punishment. In O'Connor, an inmate of a state mental facility sued
for damages for his wrongful detention, alleging that he was able 4to2
function in society, was harmless, and had been given no treatment.
The Court held that under such circumstances the state was powerless to confine him. No specific constitutional provision was relied
on by the Court; instead it noted the "Right to Liberty."43 Justice
Stewart's opinion for the Court asked:
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save
its citizens from exposure to those whose ways are different? One
might as well ask if the State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically unattractive or socially eccentric.
Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally
jus44
tify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty.
The question left unanswered by that explanation is: Why not?
The answer could lie in Robinson;45 confinement of nondangerous,
nonhelpless, nontreated mentally ill is punishment imposed upon the
status of being different. The eighth amendment, however, was not
raised or considered in O'Connor. Apparently the O'Connor right to
liberty finds its source in the due process clause. Under the O'Connor
right to liberty the incarceration is not in itself intolerable; persons
are incarcerated every day without offending the Constitution. It
is the purpose for the incarceration that is impermissible. In terms
40. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Eubank v. City of
Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912); Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1896).
41. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
42. The facts of O'Connor v. Donaldson are startling. At age 48 Kenneth
Donaldson was placed under civil arrest and three days later committed pursuant to
his father's request for a sanity hearing. For a description of the hosp ital conditions
see Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 510-12 (5th Cir. 1974). Donaldson's
confinement lasted fifteen years. During that time, "Donaldson made fourteen separate attempts before various Florida and federal courts, and four before the United
States Supreme Court to obtain release on the grounds that he was not dangerous, did
not require institutionalization, and was receiving inadequate treatment. All eighteen
attempts failed." Note, Donaldson, Dangerousness, and the Right to Treatment, 3
HASIGms CoN. L.Q. 599, 601 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
43. 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975).
44. Id. at 575.
45. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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of due process analysis, the state had no legitimate purpose for acting under the facts of the case.
In other due process cases, a general state purpose to promote
aesthetics, the tone of the community, or the quality of life is sufficient to sustain state activity. 46 Surely, such purposes are served by
regulation of the "physically unattractive or socially eccentric;" yet
the Court finds those justifications inadequate in O'Connor. The
close scrutiny of the commitment in O'Connor ordinarily is reserved
for cases presenting an invasion of some fundamental interest. 47 The
difference between due process cases in which general purposes to
promote the tone of the community are an adequate justification for
government activity and a case such as O'Connor in which these general purposes are inadequate justification cannot be the right to liberty expressed in the due process clause. That right applies equally
in both types of cases and therefore explains neither the different degrees of scrutiny nor the different results. The right to liberty referred to in O'Connor must embrace more than the liberty expressed
in the due process clause to justify the strict scrutiny.
As authority for the proposition that "mere public intolerance
or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty," O'Connor cited several cases, among them a
case involving freedom of expression, a case involving freedom of
association, and a case involving equal protection of the law. 48 The
first case, Cohen v. California,49 reversed a conviction for disturbing
the peace for wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft."
The United States Supreme Court found the conviction an invasion
of first amendment freedom of expression, remarking:
The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to
shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in
46. See, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). These cases involved regulation of adult
movie theatres displaying expression protected by the first amendment. Even with
the added weight of the first amendment on the side of the regulated individuals, a
general purpose to promote the tone of the community was enough to tip the due process scales in favor of the state.
47. At least one other writer has noted the strict scrutiny and what looks like a
fundamental interest's being protected but suggests that this scrutiny derives from the
equal protection clause. Note, Donaldson, Dangerousness, and the Right to Treatment,
3 HASTINCS CON. L.Q. 599, 611 (1976).
48. The precise citation appearing in O'Connor v. Donaldson is: "See, e.g., Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-26; Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615;
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592; cf. United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534." 422 U.S. at 575-76. All but Street v. New York are discussed
in the text. See note 50 infra.
49. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.
Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a
majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections. 50
The second case cited by O'Connor was Coates v. City of Cincinnati,51 which reversed a conviction of student demonstrators for
an "annoying" public assembly. Finding an invasion of the first
amendment right of assembly because "annoying" was not sufficiently
defined, the Court stated:
The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not permit a State to
make criminal the exercise of the right of assembly simply because its exercise may be "annoying" to some people. If this
were not the rule, the right of the people to gather in public
places for social or political purposes would be continually subject to summary suspension through the good-faith enforcement
of a prohibition against annoying conduct. And such a prohibition, in addition, contains an obvious invitation to discriminatory
enforcement against those whose association together is "annoying" because their ideas, their lifestyle, or their physical appear52
ance is resented by the majority of their fellow citizens.
What either of these cases has to do with the O'Connor right
to liberty is difficult to see, but they do suggest that the Court
was concerned with protecting eccentricity from the intolerance of
the majority. This concern is clearer in a third case cited by
O'Connor. In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,53
the Court declared unconstitutional a provision of the Food Stamp
Program that made households containing unrelated persons ineligible
under the program. The Court stated:
[I]f the constitutional conception of "equal protection of the
laws" means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group can50. Id. at 21. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), also cited by O'Connor,
is to the same effect as Cohen. Street was convicted of publicly defying or casting
contempt upon an American flag by words. The Supreme Court enumerated four
conceivable governmental interests which might have justified punishment, among them,
"an interest in protecting the sensibilities of passers-by who might be shocked by appellant's words about the American flag .....
" Id. at 591. The Court pointedly
disposed of that possible justification: "Except perhaps for appellants incidental use
of the word 'damn,' upon which no emphasis was placed at trial, any shock effect of
appellants speech must be attributed to the content of the ideas expressed. It is
firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be
prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers."
Id. at 592.
51. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
52. Id. at 615-16.
53. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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not constitute a legitimate governmental interest. As a result,
"[a] purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of
itself and without reference to [some independent] considerations
'
in the public interest, justify the 1971 amendment.
These cases indicate that the thrust of O'Connor's right to liberty was state meddling for a specifically illicit purpose - to stifle
social deviations offensive to the majority. In these cases, mere offensiveness was no concern of the state. In Cohen and Coates the
offensiveness was no concern of the state because of the specific proscriptions of the first amendment. In Moreno, a purpose specially
to affect an offensive group prompted the Court to invalidate a facially nondiscriminatory statute under the equal protection clause because
lifestyles are not a legitimate governmental concern. In O'Connor,
social eccentricity was no concern of the state, wholly apart from the
more specific constitutional prohibitions presumably necessary to the
results in the cases upon which O'Connor relied.
This Note's explanation of the result reached in O'Connor is that
the Constitution protects the fundamental interest of every individual
to be let alone: when a court finds that the purpose of state regulation is to stifle or interfere with an individual because he is different, because he is eccentric, or because his behavior is offensive to
the community, the state must show a compelling or overriding interest, apart from the offensiveness itself, to sustain the regulation.
O'Connor called this fundamental interest the "Right to Liberty."
To avoid confusion with the liberty expressed in the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, which is not the same, in this
Note this fundamental interest is called "the right of eccentricity.""
The right of eccentricity springs from various constitutional provisions or exists within the penumbra of various constitutional provisions, as did the right of privacy recognized by Griswold v. Connecticut 6 and its progeny. The right of eccentricity is rooted in
freedom of expression, freedom of association, equal protection of
the law, due process of law, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, and the ninth amendment's reservation of rights to the people.
Explicit recognition of the right would be a first step toward principled decisionmaking when these interests are asserted.
To illustrate how the right of eccentricity can draw vitality from
such diverse constitutional provisions, this Note presents a series of
haircut and shave cases, involving similar factual settings contested
under diverse constitutional provisions.
54. Id. at 534-35.
55. For discussion of the historical meaning of "liberty" appearing in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, see text accompanying notes 98-104 infra.
56. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Haircut and Shave Cases
A series of cases dealing with haircut and shaving rules illustrates
an evolution in the analysis that various lower courts have given to
the same type of facts involving an individual's right to be different,
even though the regulations were attacked under a diversity of constitutional provisions - the first amendment, eighth amendment, or
fourteenth amendment. 57 In many of the cases the courts recognized
something like a right of eccentricity, though it travelled incognito.
The sum of these cases demonstrates that explicit recognition of a
right of eccentricity would aid in consistent decisionmaking.
In Brown v. Wainwright,s George Brown, a convict in a Florida
state prison, asserted that he is a "demi-god, 'an offspring of a God
and Mortal,' and that his mustache is a gift from his creator. He
states that he is an established religion, and to require him to shave
is an infringement upon his religious liberties' as guaranteed by the
Constitution."" The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ignored the assertion of religious freedom and summarily dismissed the appeal,
stating, "For personal cleanliness and for personal identification under
prison conditions, the rule appears to be neither unreasonable nor
arbitrary."60
In Brooks v. Wainwright,6 another Florida prisoner asserted that
he had a "divine revelation" in which the "Lord God of Israel' commanded him to follow the laws of Moses, among which were Leviticus
19:27 and Numbers 6:5,2 and that therefore he should not be made
to shave or cut his hair. The district court rejected his claim as
frivolous. The Fifth Circuit was not much more generous: "Here,
as in Brown, the haircut and shave regulations promote 'cleanliness
and . . .personal identification,' so that, regardless of the source of

the religious belief, the state has not enforced an unreasonable and
arbitrary regulation." 3
In Blake v. Pryse,64 John Blake, appearing pro se, made the gen57. See, Comment, Long Hair and the Law: A Look at Constitutional and Title
VII Challenges to Public and Private Regulation of Male Grooming, 24 KAN.L. REV.
143 (1975).
58. 419 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1970).
59. Id. at 1376.
60. Id. at 1377.
61. 428 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1970).
62. "Ye shall not round the comers of your heads, neither shalt thou mar the
corners of thy beard." Luvrncus 19:27 (King James). "All the days of the vow of
his separation there shall no razor come upon his head: until the days be fulfilled,
in the which he separateth himself unto the LoRn, he shall be holy, and shall let the
locks of the hair of his head grow." N-mmans 6:5 (King James).
63. 428 F.2d 652, 653 (5th Cir. 1970).
64. 315 F. Supp. 625 (D. Minn. 1970).
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eral assertion that hair and beard rules subjected him to "personal
value judgments" of prison officials and that forcible shaving was
cruel and unusual corporal punishment. The government argued that
"[w]here many men live together in close proximity, unusual hairstyle
is offensive to some of the inmate population .... .65
Against both
the eighth and fourteenth amendment assaults, the court held that the
rules were reasonably related to hygiene and identification and were
within the discretion of the prison officials.
In Brown and Brooks, both of which raised a recognized fundamental interest under the first amendment, and in Blake, which
raised an interest almost precisely in terms of eccentricity, the courts
deferred to the judgment of the prison authorities that legitimate
interests were promoted. This deference may be attributable to
what has sometimes been called the "hands-off doctrine," 6 whereby
courts hesitate to interfere with the conduct of prisons. Yet the
hands-off doctrine does not always prevent an intrusion by the courts.
In 1971, Bobby Seale and Ericka Huggins were held in a Connecticut facility in lieu of bail.67 Neither had been convicted of any
offense. While being held, Seale was placed in "administrative segregation" for refusing to shave off his beard. The court held that
there was a federally protected right to wear a beard under the fourteenth amendment and used a balancing test to determine the validity of the purported regulation. "A test of this type permits the court
to balance the need for the regulation against the claimed constitutional right asserted by the inmate and the degree to which it has
been infringed by the regulation in question."s The only justification for the regulation asserted by the prison authorities in Seale
v. Manson was the control of vermin. The court found that there
was no vermin problem at the facility at the time and therefore concluded that the regulation was unreasonable. One factor influencing
the result was the fact that Seale was being held only in lieu of bail,
was therefore presumed not guilty, and was not subject to the same
degree of intrusion as those convicted.
Determining the reasonableness of the intrusion by whether the
person contesting it had been convicted can find little support in
reason and implies an additional punishment not authorized under
the sentence. Thus when Michael Rinehart, an inmate in an Iowa
facility, asserted that the haircut rules invaded his constitutional
65. Id. at 626.
66. See L. BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
(1975).
67. Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971).

68.

Id. at 1379.

PUNISHMENT

111
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rights, the court in Rinehart v. Brewer69 was prompt to recognize
his right to govern his own appearance but held that the right could

be infringed "to the degree necessary to effectuate legitimate and

pressing state concerns." 70 Like the court in Seale, the court in
Rinehart noted: "The true constitutional balance leaves the state
free to deal effectively with any contingency. The only restraint is
that it may not choose means which too broadly stifle fundamental
71
rights when less restrictive alternatives are reasonably available."
Unlike the court in Seale, the court in Rinehart sustained the regulation in part because prison authorities had asserted
the need for the
72
measure to aid in identification of inmates.
These last two cases are unlike the ordinary fourteenth amend-

ment case.

In Seale and Rinehart, the court independently exam-

ined the purported justification for the regulations, rather than deferring to the prison authorities. Although prison authorities claimed

the need to control vermin in Seale, the court independently found
no vermin problem at the jail and discarded that as a justification.
The authority promulgating the regulation apparently has the burden
of justifying it. Failure to raise the need for prisoner identification
in Seale prevented the court's sustaining the rule on that justification.
Furthermore, unlike the ordinary due process case, even when the
regulation is imposed for a real and legitimate reason and is formulated so as to achieve the purpose, the regulation may yet fail if it

is unnecessarily broad or unduly intrusive upon the individual. 73

69. 360 F. Supp. 105 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
70. Id. at 111.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 113.
73. There is a remarkable similarity between recognition in Rinehart of the fundamental right to govern one's own appearance and the limitation in O'Connor upon
government's power to control based on physical appearance. Rinehart builds upon
a series of cases arising under the first, eighth, and fourteenth amendments to reach
its due process result. O'Connor relies on the first and fourteenth amendments, and
there was an eighth amendment approach available to reach its due process result.
O'Connor called the protection it applied the "right of liberty." When a haircut and
shave case was presented to the United States Supreme Court in the term following
O'Connor, the Court referred to the "liberty interests" of the individuals.
In Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976), New York police officers contested
the police department's haircut and shaving rules. The action was first dismissed in
the district court but was reversed and remanded by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit for findings upon the relationship between the regulation and the legitimate interest it sought to promote. On remand, the district court ruled that the
department failed to carry its burden and found for the policemen. Without a justifying public need, the regulations imposed "[ulniformity for uniformity's sake." The
court of appeals affirmed without opinion. The United States Supreme Court reversed,
based upon the special circumstance of the government's relationship to its own employees. In dicta, the Court, per Justice Rehnquist, remarked, "[The due process
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This degree of scrutiny comports with that exercised in O'Connor.
Yet the incarceration itself does not impinge a fundamental right
and prompt the closer scrutiny. The closer scrutiny is prompted by
the subject matter of the regulation, personal liberty, just as in
O'Connor it was not the incarceration, but the reason for the incarceration, to confine those whose ways were different, that prompted
the close scrutiny. Just as in O'Connor there was an alternate route
through the eighth amendment to the result reached, there is an alternate approach to the haircut cases through the eighth amendment.
74
This approach was used in Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan.
In 1879 a California statute declared that any person found
sleeping or lodging in a room or an apartment containing less than
five hundred cubic feet of space for each person occupying it was
guilty of a misdemeanor. Ho Al Kow was convicted and sentenced
to pay a ten dollar fine or spend five days in the county jail. A San
Francisco ordinance provided that all males admitted to the county
jail were to have their hair cut within an inch of the scalp. After
his queue was cut off under this regulation, Ho Ah Kow sued the
jailer for damages, asserting that he was subjected to the additional
punishment of disgrace. The court agreed: "[T]he ordinance acts
with special severity upon Chinese prisoners, inflicting upon them
suffering altogether disproportionate to what would be endured by
other prisoners if enforced against them. Upon the Chinese prisoners
its enforcement operates as 'a cruel and unusual punishment. ''7
The court looked behind any hygiene purpose to find that the statute
was notoriously intended to act with special force upon Chinese.
clause] affords not only a procedural guarantee against the deprivation of 'liberty,'
but likewise protects substantive aspects of liberty against unconstitutional restrictions
by the State . . . . [Wlhether the citizenry at large has some sort of 'liberty' interest
within the Fourteenth Amendment in matters of personal appearance is a question on
which this Court's cases offer little, if any, guidance. We can, nevertheless, assume
an affirmative answer for purposes of deciding this case, because we find that assumption insufficient to carry the day for respondent's claim." 425 U.S. at 244. Justice
Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan in dissent, was positive of the coverage of the
"liberty" interests of the due process clause: "An individual's personal appearance
may reflect, sustain, and nourish his personality and may well be used as a means of
expressing his attitude and lifestyle. In taking control over a citizen's personal appearance, the government forces him to sacrifice substantial elements of his integrity
and identity as well. To say that the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not encompass matters of personal appearance would be fundamentally inconsistent with the values of privacy, self-identity, autonomy, and personal integrity
that I have always assumed the Constitution was designed to protect." 425 U.S. at
250-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For further development of the meaning of substantive "liberty," see text accompanying notes 98-104 infra.
74. 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,546).
75. Id. at 255.
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The court also found that the degree of intrusion upon the individual
outweighed any valid regulatory purpose. Being unjustifiable as a
regulation, it was treated as a punishment, and as a punishment it
was impermissible because it was not authorized for any offense committed and because it was excessive.
Ho Ah Kow disregarded the regulatory arguments asserted on
behalf of the haircut ordinance and examined the motive behind it
much as Trop examined the regulation working the forfeiture of citizenship. 76 In a note to Ho Ah Kow, Judge Cooley said:
There is and can be no authority in the state to punish as criminal
such practices or fashions as are indifferent in themselves, and
the observance of which does not prejudice the community or
interfere with the proper liberty of any of its members. No better illustration of one's rightful liberty in this regard can be given
than the fashion of wearing the hair. If the wearing of a queue
can be made unlawful, so may the wearing of curls by a lady or
of a mustache by a beau, and the state may, at its discretion,
fix a standard of hair-dressing to which all shall conform. The
conclusive answer to any such legislation is, that it meddles with
what is no concern of the state, and therefore invades private
right77
Nearly 100 years after Ho Ah Kow, a case reached the Supreme Court
presenting an eighth amendment attack on a regulatory measure that
permitted invasion of personal liberty. In Ingraham v. Wright,78 the
Court did not declare what state concerns might justify spanking
school children. The Court did not discuss whether the spankings
were punishment or were only regulatory invasion of personal liberty.
Instead, "spankings" were less offensively labelled "impositions." The
Court then declared that "impositions outside the criminal process"
enjoyed no eighth amendment protection. According to Ingraham,
"impositions" must be analyzed under a constitutional "liberty interest." As in O'Connor,that liberty interest seems to draw its substance
and meaning from many constitutional sources.

Ingraham v. Wright
In Ingraham, the Supreme Court was asked to apply the protec76. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
77. 12 F. Cas. at 254 n.2. The opinion in Ho Ah Kow was written by Stephen
J. Field, Justice of the United States Supreme Court, while riding circuit. According
to one contemporary, John Norton Pomeroy, Jr., it was "largely as a result of the unpopularity of the decision in the Chinese Queue Case" that Justice Field failed to receive the Democratic presidential nomination. Pomeroy, Stephen Johnson Field, in
VII GREAT AmmucAN LA-WYERs 36 (W. D. Lewis ed. 1909). Ranked with Ho Ah
Kow on the scale of unpopularity was Field's opinion in the test oath case, Cummings
v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1866), quoted in text accompanying note 98 infra.
78. 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1412 (1977).
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tion of the eighth amendment to the spanking of school childrenJ 9
The Court refused, holding per Justice Powell, that the cruel and
unusual punishment clause does not apply to "impositions" imposed
outside the criminal process. The Court did not expressly overrule
any previous decision. Instead, the Court stated that no Supreme
Court decision had ever applied the eighth amendment outside the
criminal process.80 In an opinion written by Justice White, four
members of the Court vigorously dissented from this confinement of
the eighth amendment. 8 ' The dissenters argued that whether the
eighth amendment applies to a given punishment should not depend
on the label under which it is imposed but should depend on the
purpose for which it was imposed. This analysis was employed in
Trop82- and was an essential step in the argument for a right to treat83
ment under the eighth amendment.

To this approach the majority responded, "Putting history aside
as irrelevant, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White argues that
a 'purposive analysis' should control the reach of the eighth amendment. There is no support whatever for this approach in the decisions of this Court."8 4 Not only must this statement by the majority
rely on a distorted reading of Trop, but it also ignores the Court's
previous recognition in United States v. O'Briens5 of the "purposive
analysis" used in Trop. In O'Brien a draft card burner asked the
Court to examine the purpose of the draft regulation. The Court
declined but recognized that inquiry into purpose was appropriate
to determine if a statute imposed a punishment. The Court noted
that inquiry into purpose was employed chiefly in bill of attainder
cases but also observed:
Two other decisions not involving a bill of attainder analysis contain an inquiry into legislative purpose or motive . .

.

. The

79. The spankings of James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews were not the instructive sort in which the pain rapidly fades leaving only an eloquent and remembered
lesson concerning the seriousness of the children's particular wrongdoings. "Because
he was slow to respond to his teacher's instruction, Ingraham was subjected to more
than 20 licks with a paddle while being held over a table in the principal's office.
The paddling was so severe that he suffered a hematoma requiring medical attention
and keeping him out of school for 11 days. Andrews was paddled several times for
minor infractions. On two occasions he was struck on his arms, once depriving him
of the full use of his arm for a week." Id. at 1405 (footnotes omitted).
80. "In the few cases where the Court has had occasion to confront claims that
impositions outside the criminal process constituted cruel and unusual punishment, it
has had no difficulty finding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable." Id. at 1410.
81. Id. at 1419 (White, J., dissenting).
82. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
83. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
84. 97 S.Ct. at 1412 n.39 (citation omitted).
85. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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inquiry into legislative purpose or motive in Kennedy and Trop,
however, was for the same limited purpose as in the bill of attainder decisions - i.e., to determine whether the statutes under
review were punitive in nature. 6
The majority position in Ingraham is unsound. The Court declares that the basis of the decision was the established scope of the
eighth amendment. As the dissent argued, as Trop reasoned, and
as O'Brien recognized, this limitation does not exist. In fact, the
Court constricted the boundaries of eighth amendment protection
while declaring it was standing pat.
What effect does the eighth amendment result in Ingraham have
on the right of eccentricity? O'Connor grounded its holding on the
fourteenth amendment and a right to liberty.87 This fourteenth
amendment result is undamaged by the eighth amendment holding
in Ingraham. In the only apparent reservation from its eighth amendment result, Ingraham left room for an eighth amendment contribution to the "liberty" or eccentricity result reached in O'Connor,stating:
Some punishments, though not labeled "criminal" by the State,
may be sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments in the circumstances in which they are administered to justify application
of the Eighth Amendment. We have no occasion in this case,
for example, to consider whether or under what circumstances
persons involuntarily confined in mental or juvenile institutions
can claim the protection of the Eighth Amendment. 8
After disposing of the eighth amendment issue, Ingraham next
considered whether the procedure for imposing the spankings was
consistent with due process. This issue was raised because the fourteenth amendment "liberty interests" were implicated. About these
liberty interests, the Court said: "While the contours of this historic
liberty interest in the context of our federal system of government
have not been defined precisely, they always have been thought to
encompass freedom from bodily restraint and punishment." 9 This
meaning of "liberty interests" is very much like the meaning of liberty interests involved in O'Connor. As was the case in O'Connor,
these liberty interests abut or overlap the protection of the eighth
86. Id. at 383-84 n.30. Subsequent to Ingraham v. Wright, the Supreme Court
again cited Trop v. Dulles as an example of "purposive" analysis: "The Court ...
often has looked beyond mere historical experience and has applied a functional test
of the existence of punishment, analyzing whether the law under challenge, viewed
in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further
nonpunitive legislative purposes ....
Trop v. Dulles ......
Nixon v. Administrator
of Gen. Serv., 97 S. Ct. 2777, 2807 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
87. See text accompanying notes 43-55 supra.

88. 97 S. Ct. at 1411 n.37 (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 1413-14 (footnote omitted).
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amendment. The overlapping was explicitly recognized by White's
dissent: "By finding that bodily punishment invades a constitutionally protected liberty interest within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause, the majority suggests that the Clause might also afford a
remedy for excessive spanking independently of the Eighth Amendment."9o
Although Ingraham considered only procedural due process issues, the petition for certiorari had also presented a substantive due
process issue: "'Is the infliction of severe corporal punishment upon
public school students arbitrary, capricious and unrelated to achieving
any legitimate educational purpose and therefore violative of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? ,91

Certiorari was

denied on that issue. Because Justice White, in dissent, believed
that the liberty interest as defined by the majority encompassed just
such protection as raised by the substantive due process issue in the
petition for certiorari, he would have amended the grant of certiorari
and set the case for reargument . 2 This issue, as framed in the
petition for certiorari, resembles the "purposive analysis" employed
under the due process clause in O'Connor, though now rejected by
Ingraham as inappropriate under the eighth amendment. Civil incarceration gave rise to consideration of the state's purpose under the
substantive due process issue presented, but not resolved, in Ingraham.
Logically, such an issue should be treated as the issue was treated in
O'Connor, under the hybrid concept which the Court again refers
to as a "right of liberty."
Ingraham reinforces the conception of a right of eccentricity.
The circumstances of its application suggest that part of the substance
of the right derives from principles that underlie the eighth amendment or that emanate from the penumbra of the eighth amendment.
Reviewing the Court's treatment of the due process issue, Justice
Stevens felt that the majority's definition of "liberty interest" in
Ingraham embraced protection of reputation. In a brief separate
dissent, he reflected that "the Court's analysis today gives rise to the
thought that Paul v. Davis . . . may have been correctly decided on
93
an incorrect rationale.."
94
Paul v. Davis was an action against police officials who had

circulated a flyer designating the plaintiff as an active shoplifter.
The plaintiff claimed that circulation of the flyer invaded his "'lib90.

Id. at 1422 n.5 (White, J., dissenting).

91.

Id. at 1406 n.12.

92.
93.

Id. at 1422 n.5 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Id. at 1428 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

94.

424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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erty' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 95 The Court, per
Justice Rehnquist, rejected this contention and rejected the contention that the plaintiff had protectable privacy interests at stake.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, dissented
because "the Court by mere fiat and with no analysis wholly excludes
personal interest in reputation from the ambit of 'life, liberty, or property . . . .' "
Brennan's dissenting opinion also remarked that "privacy notions appear to be inextricably interwoven with the considerations which require that a State not single an individual out for
punishment outside the judicial process."r Justice Stevens thought
these concerns, rejected by the majority in Paul v. Davis, were revived by the majority opinion in Ingraham.
Justice Stevens' dissent provokes speculation concerning the proper constitutional treatment of cases presenting invasions of reputation,
regardless of whether the court concludes that reputation is entitled
to constitutional protection. In Paul v. Davis, reputation was asserted as an element of privacy. The right of privacy, however, was
not at issue in Ingraham. There, the majority's definition of liberty
interests stimulated Justice Stevens' remark. If, as is this Note's
theory, the liberty interest in Ingraham, like the right of liberty in
O'Connor,embraces protection of eccentricity, perhaps Justice Stevens'
remark is well taken. Reputation, based upon public acceptance or
rejection of an individual's behavior or demeanor, is closely akin to
the notions of public intolerance or animosity underlying the result
in O'Connor. Unlike O'Connor, Ingraham rests its liberty interest
directly upon the liberty expressed in the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. In fact, including reputation interests within the protection of the due process clause is not a new concept. In
Cummings v. Missouri,98 involving a bill of attainder, the Court discussed generally what deprivations could be punishments:
We do not agree with the counsel of Missouri that "to punish one is to deprive him of life, liberty, or property, and that to
take from him anything less than these is no punishment at all."
The learned counsel does not use these terms - life, liberty, and
property - as comprehending every right known to the law. He
does not include under liberty freedom from outrage on the feelings as well as restraints on the person. He does not include
under property those estates which one may acquire in professions, though they are often the source of the highest emoluments
and honors. The deprivation of any rights, civil or political,
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 697.
Id. at 721 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
Id. at 735 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71 U.S. 277 (1866).
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previously enjoyed, may be punishment, the attending circumstances and the causes of the deprivation determining this fact. 9
Outrage upon the feelings, an invasion of fourteenth amendment
liberty according to Cummings, and taints upon reputation, an invasion of fourteenth amendment liberty according to three justices
dissenting in Paul v. Davis and one justice dissenting in Ingraham,
have the same historical stature as elements of liberty as does the
freedom from bodily restraint and punishment recognized as an element of liberty by the majority in Ingraham. "[C]ertainly where the
State attaches 'a badge of infamy' to the citizen, due process comes
into play. .... Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or
integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,
notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential."' 0 0
The fourteenth amendment provision that no person shall be deprived of "liberty" without due process of law was borrowed from
the thirty-ninth article of the Great Charter (Magna Carta), declaring that no free man be taken, or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or banished; the words corresponding to "liberty" are "taken,"
"imprisoned," "outlawed," and "banished;" they are not confined
to
mere freedom from incarceration or imprisonment. 10 1
"Outlawry" at common law was akin to attainder, which is specifically condemned by Article I, section 9 and Article I, section 10 of
the United States Constitution. At one stroke, "outlawry" convicted,
denied the protection of law, and heaped the opprobrium and special
notoriety of the label "outlaw" upon its victim. 10 2 Outlawry was
equally obnoxious for its lack of procedural protections as for the opprobrium it selectively applied, beyond the needs of society when
99. Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
100. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (quoting id.).
101. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 500 (7th ed.
1906); in Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97, 107 (1909), plaintiff's
likeness was used in the commercial exploitation of defendant's Auto Coats of Fine
Quality Silk Mohair; the court found that the "right to be let alone" of the Warren
and Brandeis article, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890), embraced
only freedom from physical invasions, relying in part upon COOLEY ON TORTS 29
(1879). On page 30, however, Judge Cooley noted, "The law also gives to every
man a right to security in his reputation." This is the same Judge Cooley who wrote
the note discussing grooming regulations in Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, see text accompanying note 77 supra.

102. See, III

BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES

284, and IV

BLACKSTONE'S COMMEN-

320: "antiently an outlawed felon was said to have caput lupinum, and might
be knocked on the head like a wolf, by any one that should meet him .... " See also
one of the dissents in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, in which Justice Black compared
the due process considerations to those forbidding bills of attainder, 400 U.S. 433, 444
TARIES

(Black, J., dissenting).
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punishing. Attacks upon private reputation by means of outlawry,
attainder, the flyers used in Paul v. Davis, or the "postings" used in
Wisconsin v. Constantineau,10 3 betoken a generalized governmental
malice in the form of routine disregard for individual dignity.
Constantineauinvolved posted notices that prohibited the sale of alcoholic beverages to named individuals. One reason underlying the
need for due process safeguards in Constantineau was that the
"posted" person "may have been the victim of an official's caprice." 10 4
"Liberty" comprehends freedom from invasions upon reputation,
and therefore such invasions implicate the fourteenth amendment.
Furthermore, when governmental action is taken for the purpose of
invading private reputation, the long discarded practice of outlawry and attainder is raised, and such purposeful action should be condemned as a per se violation of the fourteenth amendment. No
amount of labyrinthine procedural safeguards will legalize the trampling of individual dignity to satisfy the casual ire of government.
Such a purpose is illegitimate and action in furtherance of an illegitimate purpose is substantively forbidden, just as a purpose to attaint is forbidden.
This history and analysis of the treatment of reputation within
the "liberty" of the fourteenth amendment suggests that the purpose
behind governmental action may trigger strict scrutiny and substantive due process analysis. This approach was triggered in O'Connor
v. Donaldson, when by process of elimination, the Court determined
that the purpose of the commitment was to protect the public "from
exposure to those whose ways are different."
The thesis of this Note, that eccentricity is a fundamental right
deserving protection under the fourteenth amendment, may be no
more than a postulate of the rule that government may not act solely
to satisfy a malicious urge, and when the purpose of an action is to
stifle eccentricity, malice is presumed.
Apart from the narrow question of the protection appropriate for
reputation under the "liberty" of the due process clause, Paul v. Davis
also suggests an overlapping of the privacy interests and liberty interests at stake. Whether this overlapping is always the case is not
clear. In Moreno,'0 5 the Food Stamp case, the government's intrusion into the individual's liberty interest took the form of a regulatory
disincentive for his lifestyle. An intrusion upon his lifestyle may not
have been enough to implicate a right of privacy. Perhaps in Paul
v. Davis, the Court would not have confronted the procrustean effort
at fitting reputation into the pattern of privacy notions if a separately
103. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
104. Id. at 437.
105. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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formulated notion of eccentricity were available. In any event, proper definition of the orbit of the right of eccentricity in relation to that
of the right of privacy must await the future of the right of eccentricity in the Court.
Regardless of the interplay with the right of privacy, Ingraham
through its use of "liberty interests" that seem broader than the liberty expressed in the fourteenth amendment and that seem to include
some protections of the eighth amendment again seems to alloy the
same constitutional ores that O'Connor forged into its right to liberty
and that protect eccentricity.
The Right of Eccentricity
The Supreme Court and commentators speak of the Bill of Rights
and the fourteenth amendment in terms of rights, interests, and safeguards. Such terminology provokes an unnecessary compartmentalization of the individual freedom at the heart of the amendments.
By rejecting this compartmentalization, the Court was able to identify
and dignify individual privacy as partaking of the essence of the
constitutional system. A central concern of the Bill of Rights is the
freedom to be let alone.
Once before, the Supreme Court induced that many prohibitions
of the Bill of Rights derived from a single concept and sought to protect a single freedom. The right of privacy was then given explicit
recognition and protection under the fourteenth amendment. About
the constitutional guarantee of privacy, Justice Brandeis noted in dissent in Olmstead v. United States:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."'
The right of privacy generally applies to governmental intrusion
at moments when the individual may reasonably expect to exclude
the prying eyes and ears of the state. Cannot the "right to be let
alone" apply in public as well as private moments? In a world become increasingly crowded, when individuals may reasonably expect
privacy at fewer moments, when each person's tics and idiosyncracies
are thrust upon his neighbors in the traffic of daily commerce, in
the interdependency of industrial society when few individuals can
106.
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afford seclusion and avoid daily public exposure, is it reasonable that
the individual may expect to be let alone only in private?
Americans may expect the freedom to be "physically unattractive or socially eccentric" even in public. In O'Connor, Donaldson's
mehtal illness could not be considered a form of expression or assocition, a lifestyle, a status unaccompanied by any activity; any one
might confer the freedom to be publicly annoying. In any of these
situations the court requires an overriding and compelling state justification to sustain the regulation of aberrant but harmless behavior.
In O'Connor the court applied the same rule even though none of
these specific constitutional provisions was touched upon, demanding
that the state offer an overriding justification for state action undertaken solely for the purpose of control and confinement of aberrant
behavior.
The right of eccentricity, to behave as one pleases, free of government control even when public animosity is aroused, has found
protection through two distinct rules. First, when a government purpose to control eccentricity can be shown, the state action is subject
to strict scrutiny and must be justified by an overriding state interest.
Second, when a regulation stifles harmless eccentric behavior, a simple
need for uniformity or standardization is not a legitimate state concern.
The materials discussed in this Note seem elements of a single
encompassing freedom, the right of eccentricity, fragmented but enjoying particular protections under many constitutional provisions.
The eighth amendment guarantees that punishments be no more severe than the need of society to impose them and circumscribes the
power of the state to declare a status criminal. According to Justice
Brennan, preservation
of human dignity is the essence of the eighth
0 7
amendment.1

Traditionally, the need of society to impose a punishment has
been considered a legislative prerogative, beyond judicial cognizance.
An examination of the need for a punishment would require a court
to ascertain for what purpose it is imposed and whether it reasonably
accomplishes that purpose. At least in the case of expatriation, where
the purposes for which Congress might act were limited, the Supreme
Court was prepared to examine Congress' purpose and the usefulness
of expatriation to its achievement.
107. "The State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their
intrinsic worth as human beings. A punishment is 'cruel and unusual,' therefore, if
it does not comport with human dignity." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). For this proposition, Justice Brennan relied on
the remark of the plurality opinion in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958): "The
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man."
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The first amendment precludes state regulation of expression or
assembly for the purpose of stifling minority views or manners of
expression. Speech or assembly may not be punished simply because
it is offensive. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prevents governmental regulation for the purpose of suppressing
an undesirable lifestyle. The due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment protects against arbitrariness or unnecessary regulation.
Many cases dealing with haircut and shave regulations hold that personal appearance is not a legitimate concern of the state.
Viewed in the light of a broader notion of constitutional liberty,
the principles examined in this Note seem to derive from the same
source. These principles converged in O'Connor, where the court
termed the interest, the right of liberty. The same right of liberty
arose once more in Ingraham and again seemed to involve a broader
notion of freedom than the compartmentalized protection of the fourteenth amendment alone. In the haircut and shave cases, there is
an evolving recognition of an interest protected regardless of whether
the regulation is contested under the first, eighth, or fourteenth amendments. Freedom to act as one chooses, though not absolute, contemplates no unnecessary intrusion. When the purpose of a governmental action or regulation is to circumscribe aberrant behavior, that
behavior must endanger society to justify its control.
Governmental action that intrudes upon aberrant but harmless
behavior may occur more often than the name "eccentricity" suggests.
Eccentricity depends not upon the degree of aberration but upon
harmlessness or nondangerousness. The definition of "eccentricity"
applies to a broad spectrum of activity, beyond matters of physical
appearance or reputation. Perhaps the ultimate impact of this right
lies in the area of "victimless" crimes or "regulatory" measures: victimless crimes such as prostitution, homosexuality, gambling, and
marijuana use' 08 or regulatory measures such as involuntary commitment of juveniles or the mentally ill or involuntary sterilization of
the feeble minded. 10 9 Some of these activities or statuses may present real dangers to society. Perhaps some do not. Whether or not,
would it be improper for the courts to loosen the tight belt of selfrestraint they have long worn and ask whether the control or punishment of such eccentricities is any legitimate concern of the state?
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